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ABSTRACT

VOGT, IAN. Does player performance outside of Major League Baseball translate to the MLB?
Department of Economics, March 2018.
ADVISOR: Professor Tomas Dvorak
Statistical analysis has transformed the way front offices across Major League Baseball
manage the rosters of their teams. However, much of this statistical analysis is limited to
evaluating players playing in the American major league environment. Little has been done in
the way of using statistical analysis to evaluate how performance translates from league-toleague, and the market for international and college players remains highly inefficient, despite
expansion of these player pools. My study is an attempt to make this market a more efficient one.
I measure the correlation between performance in two top international baseball leagues
(Nippon Professional Baseball and the Korean Baseball Organization) as well as America’s top
amateur league (the NCAA) and performance in Major League Baseball. I am studying three
performance metrics for both batters and pitchers: strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate. I
find that these metrics in the foreign and amateur leagues studied account for little of the
variation in Major League performance. However, the predictive power of foreign league
statistics is not significantly lower than the predictive power of past performance in the MLB,
indicating predicting player performance is a difficult task.
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1. Introduction
There is a higher influx of professional players from Korean and Japanese
professional leagues into the major leagues than ever before. Before 1990, only two
Japanese-born players made it to the major league level. Since then 62 have, with the
latest one, Shohei Otani, being one of the top stories from this past offseason. Chan-Ho
Park became the first Korean-born player to debut in the major leagues in 1994. In total,
only 23 Koreans have played in Major League Baseball, 10 of which have debuted in the
past five seasons. Yet even as the market for these players grows, inefficiencies remain.
In 2014, the Boston Red Sox thought they had solved their problem in replacing former
all-star center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury when they signed Cuban outfielder Rusney Castillo
to a 7-year/$72.5 million contract from the Cuban National Series (CNS), the richest
contract ever given to a Cuban international free agent. The success of other Cuban
professionals who had previously made the transition to the major leagues, such as
Yoenis Cespedes, Yasiel Puig, and Jose Abreu, had paved the way for Castillo’s payday.
However, in the three-plus Major League seasons since signing, Castillo has only
appeared in 99 major league games, and was relegated to the Red Sox’ top minor league
affiliate for the entire 2017 season. Castillo’s payday came in the midst of Abreu’s rookie
year, a season in which Abreu won the American League Rookie of the Year and finished
fourth in AL MVP voting. Abreu had signed for 6 years/$68 million the previous winter,
a contract that at the time was a record for a Cuban international free agent. Abreu
showed the remarkable success a Cuban free agent could have in his first season,
expanding the market for Castillo. Yet, despite the richer contract, Castillo’s numbers in
the CNS were markedly worse than Abreu’s. In his last five seasons playing in Cuba,
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Abreu never recorded an on-plate plus slugging (OPS) lower than 1.068; Castillo’s never
went higher than .940 in any of his five seasons playing in the CNS, and he was coming
off a season in which his OPS was a meager .770. Was Castillo’s performance in the
CNS predictive of his MLB performance?
I collect data on individual player statistics from Nippon Professional Baseball
(NPB), the Korean Baseball Organization (KBO), and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in order to equate performance in one league to performance in the
MLB. I merge this data with individual player data from the MLB and pick out players
that have transitioned from a foreign or amateur league to the MLB, measuring how nonMLB performance lines up with MLB performance. I use sample minimums and a set
timeframe before and after the transition is made that will be discussed later in this paper.
We know that both pitchers and hitters have little effect on the batting average on
balls in play (BABIP). Typically, this statistic will regress to around .300 over time. In
plain English, a ball put in play results in a hit about 30% of the time, regardless of how
well the ball is hit. Exceptions exist for both pitchers and hitters, but this information has
shifted the focus of sabermetric analysis in baseball towards the analysis of outcomes that
do not involve balls in play, and are therefore not subject to the inherent small-sample
randomness of BABIP. These plays—strikeouts, walks, and homeruns—are known as the
three true outcomes of baseball, and will be the basis for my analysis. I will be focusing
on statistics that indicate the frequency at which a play ends in each of these outcomes—
strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate—for both hitters and pitchers. Using these
numbers, I will run regressions and attempt to establish the correlation between a player’s
statistics in foreign leagues and the NCAA to the player’s statistics in the major leagues. I
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believe there is a higher chance of strong correlation between the three true outcome
statistics than other metrics.
I believe that the development of these sabermetrics and other statistics has
already and will continue to expand the usefulness of statistical analysis in professional
baseball, and could perhaps be the breakthrough needed to properly evaluate players in
the leagues I am studying. As statistical analysis in sports continues to develop, there is a
greater emphasis on metrics that identify specific player skills and measure them
independent of the team environment around them. For example, in baseball, a statistic
like runs batted in (RBI) would not be a good identifier of true player performance
because his teammates hitting ahead of him must reach base and run the bases well for
that player to be attributed an RBI. Batting average would be a bad statistic to study for
my model because it takes too long to stabilize, and is highly correlated with BABIP.
Strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate are measures of three specific skills for
pitchers and hitters.
2. Literature Review
In 1996, Clay Davenport, co-founder of the sabermetric baseball website Baseball
Prospectus, developed a context-independent metric called Equivalent Average (EqA),
which attempted to put all baseball players in all leagues onto a level playing field.
Ballparks, leagues, and platoon matchups can all be advantageous for a pitcher or a hitter,
distorting statistics that do not account for these effects. A left-handed hitter may be used
exclusively in platoon matchups against right-handed pitchers, which provides a
substantial advantage for the hitter. A player might play in a ballpark like Coors Field,
built in the high atmosphere of Denver, Colorado where the ball carries more, providing
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another advantage for hitters. A ballpark can also be built to be pitcher-friendly, with
long distances to high-standing walls providing for difficult home run targets, like San
Francisco’s AT&T Park. In addition to this, some leagues such as the Korean Baseball
Organization (KBO) have reputations as hitter-friendly. EqA is an attempt to neutralize
all of this and develop one metric for comparing baseball players should they all compete
in the same environment against the same competition. Although scaled like batting
average, EqA attempts to capture runs produced per at bat, something more along the
lines of modern-day all-encompassing sabermetrics like weighted runs created (wRC) or
weighted on-base average (wOBA). Although most commonly cited to compare Major
League players from different eras, EqA can be used to measure how a foreign or minor
league player might perform in a major league environment. Davenport’s work will be
the foundation of my study.
The specific metrics studied in this paper are worthy talking points. Franks,
D’Amour, Cervone, and Bornn (2016) analyzed the effectiveness of various basketball
and hockey statistics, using three meta-metrics by which they evaluate a statistics
effectiveness. This same kind of process will be applied to determine which baseball
metrics are the best to study. Specifically, Franks, D’Amour, Cervone and Bornn evaluate
metrics for their stability, or whether or not they are predictive in nature. This is to say
whether someone’s performance metric in 2016 would help predict that same
performance metric in 2017. Baseball is subject to small-sample volatility. Even
commonly cited hitting metrics like on-base plus slugging (OPS) can be extremely
volatile season-to-season. Adam Dunn was a productive hitter during his 14-year career.
The worst offensive season of Dunn’s career came in 2011, when he hit to a meager 54
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OPS+ (OPS weighted with league average set equal to 100). Dunn never had another
season, before or after 2011, with an OPS+ lower than 105. 2011 was the one and only
season in which Dunn was a worse-than-league-average hitter, and in that one season, he
was significantly worse than the league average. This speaks to not only the volatility
inherent to the game of baseball, but also to the volatility in the sport’s statistics. Of the
three metrics I am focusing my model on, home run rate is subject to some season-toseason volatility, but strikeout rate and walk rate are extremely stable baseball metrics. I
predict that, because of this, my model will more accurately predict performance based
on strikeout rate and walk rate than home run rate.
One potential issue with my model is how performance can differ based on age.
When comparing a player’s age 22 season to his age 27 season, a bigger reason for
difference in performance than the environment or the league he plays in could be the
improvement a player has made in that time. For that reason, I will be attempting to
incorporate age effects into my model. Fair (2008) estimated age effects for both hitters
and pitchers in the same paper, but used on-base percentage (OBP), on-base plus
slugging (OPS), and earned-run average (ERA). Much work on hitter and pitcher aging
curves have been done independently of each other. Petti (2012) produced age curves for
pitchers that use strikeouts per nine innings, walks per nine innings, and home runs per
nine innings, very similar statistics to the ones I am studying. Zimmerman (2014)
published aging curves for walk rate, strikeout rate and home runs per 600 plate
appearances. Typically, peak performance for a hitter occurs between ages 26-28.
However, specific hitter skills like walk rate and home run rate tend to increase until ages
30-32. Pitchers stay closer to peak performance a bit longer than hitters, but also
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encounter a steeper decline as they age into their mid-to-late 30’s. It is also important to
keep the survivor bias in mind, which states that one way aging curves can be
misrepresentative is because players who survive the big leagues in year one may have
only survived because of small-sample luck, and as a result may see a false drop in
performance in year two. Because of the issues and complications in implementing aging
curves, I will simply be controlling for age in my regression equation.
The economic relevance of my model is based on proper valuation of what a free
agent should be worth in professional baseball. Much work has been done on developing
a model for this based on dollars spent on a free agent contract and a player’s Wins
Above Replacement (WAR), an all-encompassing metric that attempts to estimate a
player’s value in terms of wins based on his all-around performance. Although I am not
studying WAR, some of the literature done on this topic will provide good context for the
current state of player valuation in Major League Baseball. WAR is simply an estimation
of overall player productivity, and there are multiple calculations of the metric. For the
sake of the rest of my study, whenever referring to WAR, I will be using the Fangraphs
calculation for WAR known as fWAR. Weinberg (2016) details a few key principles in
how to evaluate a free agent contract. One is that teams sign players for future
performance, not past performance. In the context of an international free agent, a team
signs a player not for what he did in the KBO or the NPB, but for what a team thinks that
player can do at the Major League level. This is the relevance of my model; teams are not
going to sign players based on how good their numbers were in another league, teams are
going to sign players based on how they think those numbers will translate to the major
leagues. That is where a predictive model like mine can come in handy. Another
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important factor is inflation, which will need to be accounted for when evaluating the
efficiency with which teams have handed out contracts to international free agents in the
past. A player making $8 million in 2006 is not the same as a player making $8 million in
2016, not just because of the inflation of the United States Dollar, but also due to the
inflation of the labor market in professional baseball. The final key principle from
Weinberg (2016) is that teams pay for an entire contract. A team may sign a player to a
five-year deal worth $50 million, get a bargain in the first two years, and a fair level of
performance in the following two before the contract becomes an albatross in the final
year. At the end of the contract, if the total WAR of a player is worth more than the WAR
that $50 million typically buys on the open market, no matter the distribution of
performance, the contract was a good contract for the team. Swartz (2017) concluded that
in 2017 teams spent on average $10.5 million per win in terms of WAR.
If a win is worth $10.5 million on the major league free agent market, then how
have recent international free agents lived up to their financial billing? The international
market for major leaguers has been extremely hit or miss. I have already discussed the
example of Rusney Castillo, a major Cuban flop on the part of the Boston Red Sox.
However, extremes exist on the other end of the spectrum as well. Jung-ho Kang signed
with the Pittsburgh Pirates out of the KBO ahead of the 2015 season. Kang was one of
the first Korean ballplayers to come up in the KBO and transition to the MLB, so the
market was rightfully skeptical on Kang, and he received only a 4 year/$11 million
contract. Despite missing the entire 2017 season for reasons other than performance,
Kang amassed 6.0 fWAR in his first two Major League seasons, playing only 229 out of
a possible 324 games. Six wins over the lifespan of a contract is worth $63 million based
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on the model made by Swartz (2017). Kang accumulated that in the first two years of a
deal worth just $11 million total. There is further evidence of the international free agent
market being an inefficient one. Yoenis Cespedes signed for $36 million over four years
before the 2012 season and tallied 15.3 fWAR over the life of his contract. Jose Abreu
will enter the fifth year of his six-year contract in 2018, but has already collected 14.5
fWAR in his time at the major league level, a figure that would be worth $152.25 million
on the open market today according to Swartz’s model. There are also more examples of
busts like Castillo, such as Daisuke Matsuzaka, who the Red Sox paid a total of $103
million for in both negotiating rights and contract fees before the 2007 season, and who
totaled just 7.5 fWAR over the life his six-year contract. Based on this, one can conclude
major league teams have had difficulty in evaluating the international free agent market.
The goal of my model is to make this market a more efficient one.
Russell Carleton originally published a piece on stabilization points for some
baseball metrics in 2007 on StatSpeak.net. His article was re-published on Fangraphs in
2011 and was further summarized in the website’s library. Carleton (2007) discusses the
issues with evaluating baseball players based on statistics measured in small sample
sizes, and attempts to establish a cutoff point where these statistics are able to quantify
true performance. It should be noted that these stabilization points are not magic numbers
where these metrics all of a sudden become stable. Rather, these metrics will get more
and more stable as the sample of plate appearances/batters faced grows, and the
stabilization points are simply baselines. He uses the threshold of where R-squared =
0.49, or where the correlation coefficient of one sample of plate appearances and another
sample of the same size equals 0.7 and where greater than 50% of the variance within the
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sample is stable, as the point of stabilization for baseball statistics. Carleton also reveals
that different metrics will have different stabilization points. For batters, strikeout rate
stabilizes at 60 plate appearances, walk rate at 120 plate appearances, and home run rate
at 170 plate appearances. For pitchers, strikeout rate stabilizes at 70 batters faced, walk
rate at 170 batters faced, and home run rate at 1,320 batters faced. Carleton encounters a
similar issue to one that my study has: anytime a minimum sample requirement is used, it
becomes a selective sample. Playing time is not distributed randomly; better players play
more, and as a result, become a bigger part of the sample.
3. Data
The foreign and amateur leagues I analyze are the Korean Baseball Organization
(KBO), Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB), and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). The NPB and KBO are two of the top foreign leagues from which
MLB teams will consider signing professionals. Teams draft players out of the NCAA,
which will be the only amateur league I study. These represent some of the major player
pools from which major league teams consider players for their organizations. Players are
also drafted out of high school, but statistics from high school leagues are difficult to
come across, and attempting to quantify the wide range of competition across high school
baseball in the United States would be extremely onerous.
The metrics studied are strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate. These
encapsulate baseball’s three true outcomes, which are the metrics hitters and pitchers
have the most control over, and therefore are the most important to study when
evaluating player performance.

9

I have gathered data from a few different sources for use in this project. I am
using the Sean Lahman data set for all of my MLB data. The Lahman data provides
statistics throughout all of major league history through the 2016 season. I gathered KBO
and NPB data from http://japanesebaseball.com/data/index.gsp. I am using the Batting,
Pitching, and Players sheets from the Pro Yakyu Database by Michael Westbay for the
NPB, and the Master, Batting, and Pitching data sheets from user Beemer’s Korean
Baseball Database. Both my KBO and NPB data only go through the 2008 season, so I
added any players who switched to the MLB after that using tables from
baseballreference.com. For NCAA data, I purchased both batting and pitching data for
the 2013-2017 seasons from http://www.thebaseballcube.com/. This means my NCAA
data will consist of all batters and pitchers who played an NCAA season in 2013 or later
and have since debuted in the MLB.
Each data source came with sets of batter statistics, pitching statistics, and a
master set with all players and matching player identifications. For each league being
studied, I joined the batting and pitching data with the master data to match players with
their statistics. I then combined the plate appearances/batters faced, strikeouts, walks, and
home runs for each player for the first three MLB seasons and final three non-MLB
seasons from all leagues being studied, and calculated strikeout rate, walk rate, and home
run rate for each player to use as variables in my regressions.
Only the NCAA data came with an age variable, so I manually estimated age for
much of this data. I did so by subtracting the season year from a player’s birth year.
I have also limited the data to only the three seasons before and after a player
made the transition from a foreign or amateur league to the MLB. For example, Akinori
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Iwamura left the NPB for the MLB after the 2006 season. This means his 2004-2006
seasons in the NBP and his 2007-2009 seasons in the MLB are the ones accounted for in
my data. I do this in order to account for the natural progression or regression of a
player’s skill set over time. Constraining the timeframe to within a set window centered
on a player’s last year before transitioning to the MLB paints a clearer statistical picture
for how much a player’s performance is affected.
The criteria for a player to be included in the data is 170 engagements—plate
appearances for hitters and batters faced for pitchers—over the course of the three-year
window in one of the non-MLB leagues being studied, followed by at least 170
engagements in the MLB over the following three-year window. The 170 figure is based
on work done by Carleton (2007) detailed above in the literature review section.
Carleton’s initial figures published on StatSpeak.net in 2007 are slightly different from
the ones Fangraphs’ posted in its library in 2011. For the sake of my study, I will be using
Fangraphs’ updated versions of Carleton’s stabilization points. According to Carleton
(2007), the stabilization for a pitcher’s home run rate is 1,320 batters faced, which poses
an issue as no pitcher faces that many hitters over the course of a single season anymore,
and even applying that criteria over a three-year window would severely limit the number
of observations. Since the 170 threshold covers five of the six metrics I am studying, I am
going ahead with 170 plate appearances/batters faced as my sample minimum.
Before applying Carleton’s 170 rule, my data consisted of 140 batters. With the
170 rule, my batting data consists of 39 players (five from the KBO, seven from the
NCAA, and 27 from the NPB.
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Table 1

The average non-MLB strikeout rate among these 38 players is 16.64%, while the
average MLB strikeout rate is 18.67%. The maximum non-MLB strikeout rate is Darnell
Coles at 32.41% and the minimum MLB strikeout rate is Tony Batista at 3.88%, while
the maximum MLB strikeout rate is Byung Ho Park (32.79%) and the minimum MLB
strikeout rate is Kenji Johima (8.2%). For walk rate, the non-MLB average is 13.89%,
while the MLB average is 7.96%. The maximum non-MLB walk rate is Kosuke
Fukudome at 23.21% and minimum the non-MLB walk rate is Hiroki Kuroda at 2.91%,
while the maximum MLB walk rate is Fukudome (14.67%) and the minimum MLB walk
rate is Johima (3.69%). Home run rate follows a similar trend to walk rate, as the average
non-MLB home run rate is 5.02%, while the average MLB home run rate is 2.59%. The
maximum non-MLB home run rate is Jolbert Cabrera’s 14.65% and the minimum nonMLB home run rate is Kuroda’s 0.34%, while the maximum MLB home run rate is Kyle
Schwarber (5.76%) and minimum MLB home run rate is Kuroda and Tsuyoshi Nishioka
(0%). None of these results are unexpected; assuming MLB is a more difficult league
than the KBO, NPB and NCAA, and player performance should dip as a result, MLB
strikeout rate should be higher than non-MLB strikeout rate, while MLB home run rate
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and walk rate should be lower than non-MLB home run rate and walk rate. I see these
trends play out in both the means and medians. The standard deviation on strikeout rate
for both MLB and non-MLB data is the highest, while standard deviation on home run
rate for MLB and non-MLB is the lowest. This makes sense, because strikeouts are the
highest-frequency event of the three studied, while home runs are the lowest.
Without Carleton’s 170 rule, my pitching data consisted of 149 pitchers. With it,
my pitching data consists of 83 players (16 from the KBO, 18 from the NCAA and 49
from the NPB). It is interesting to note that this is more than twice the number of
observations in this data relative to my batting data. It appears teams have been more
willing to sign pitchers from foreign leagues, and more willing to rush college pitchers
through the ranks of minor league baseball after being drafted than college batters.

Table 2

The average non-MLB strikeout rate in this data is 20.5%, while the average MLB
strikeout rate is 17.79%. The maximum non-MLB strikeout rate is 40.19% (Kazhiro
Sasaki) and minimum non-MLB strikeout rate is 8.021% (Mike Fyhrie), while the
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maximum MLB strikeout rate is 32.91% Seung-Hwan Oh and minimum MLB strikeout
rate is 9.16% (Brian Sweeney). The average non-MLB walk rate is 7.25%, while the
average MLB walk rate is 8.39%. The maximum non-MLB walk rate is Wes
Obermueller’s 14.573% and minimum non-MLB walk rate is Kyle Crockett’s 3.1%,
while the maximum MLB walk rate is Kuzhisa Ishii’s 14.55% and minimum MLB walk
rate is Koji Uehara’s 3.74%. The average non-MLB home run rate is 1.99%, while the
average MLB home run rate is 3.14%. The maximum non-MLB home run rate is 8.41%
(Pete Walker) and minimum non-MLB home run rate is 0% (Crockett and Marco
Gonzales), while the maximum MLB home run rate is 6.06% (Chad Green) and
minimum MLB home run rate is 1.13% (Crockett). These results are a bit less expected
than the results of the batting data. For one, the walk rate is very similar for MLB and
non-MLB data in terms of standard deviation, maximum and minimum, while the means
are also close. The maximum non-MLB home run rate is higher than the maximum MLB
home run rate, which is also unexpected, but the median and mean is lower in the nonMLB group, which is expected. The standard deviations follow the same pattern as the
batting data. The means follow the inverse patterns of the batting data, as expected,
where strikeout rate is lower in the MLB, while walk rate and home run rate is higher in
the MLB.
4. Model Design
I will be running regression models to determine the correlation between
performance metrics in the top foreign/amateur leagues and Major League Baseball. The
end goal for my model will be to predict a player’s strikeout rate, walk rate and home run
rate in the MLB based on his performance in terms of those same metrics in another
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league. I may find that certain metrics are undervalued when it comes to statistical
analysis performed on players from outside leagues, or that statistical analysis is indeed
largely useless when it comes to evaluating players across environments. Not only will
my model aim to help better predict the performance of high-priced international free
agents and top college draft picks, but it should also help uncover hidden gems, or
players who are being wrongly overlooked by professional teams despite strong
underlying metrics.
I limit my inputs to exclusively players who made the transition from a foreign,
minor, or amateur league to the major leagues, and not the other way. It is common for a
player at the tail end of his career to play overseas in hopes of extending his career.
However, that data will not be applicable here, as I am developing a model for predicting
performance in the MLB based on statistics from other leagues, not the other way around.
I also limit my output MLB data to the first three years of a player’s major league career.
This is because, at the end of year three, it is reasonable to expect other major league
evaluators to evaluate a foreign player exclusively on his major league numbers.
5. Model
I run regressions for each of the three metrics detailed above. The dependent
variable is the metric for a hitter or pitcher in a major league environment, while the
independent variables are the same metric for a hitter or pitcher in another environment,
as well as a combination of league dummy variables, the interactions between the
dummies and the non-MLB metric, and age. The regression equation will look as such:
yi = β0 + β1 * xi + β2 * NCAA + β3 * NPB + β4 * xi * NPB + β5 * xi * NCAA + β6 * Age
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yi represents performance for player i in Major League Baseball, while xi represents
performance through the same metric in another league. There is a set of dummy
variables, with the complete set representing the NPB and NCAA, while KBO is the
omitted dummy. For each regression, the hypotheses will be as follows:
H0: β1 = 0
H1: β1 ≠ 0
The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the non-MLB performance metric is zero,
indicating no relationship between Major League performance and performance in other
leagues. I use a two-sided alternative hypothesis because the relationships between the
metrics could be positive or negative. β1 is my correlation coefficient that can be used to
forecast statistical translations after the model is developed. Β2 and β3 are dummy
variables that differentiate which league I am comparing to the MLB, with all leagues
except KBO garnering a dummy variable coefficient. When all dummy variable
coefficients are zero, KBO is the league being measured against the MLB. β4 and β5
measure the interactions between the league dummies and the studied metrics, allowing
me to differentiate the correlation coefficients for different leagues. β6 is an attempt to
control for the natural aging curve that occurs in athletes through an age variable. We can
expect that a player’s performance in professional baseball will peak in his late 20’s. If a
player played in a foreign league in his 20’s and the major leagues in his 30’s, his
performance is expected to dip even further than usual. I estimate separate models for
pitchers and hitters and for each different metric. I only evaluate players through the 2016
season, since that is where the Lahman data ends at the time of this project.
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6. Model Results

Table 3

Table 3 shows the results of my regressions. There are six specifications, one for
each of the three dependent variables (MLB strikeout rate, MLB walk rate, MLB home
run rate) with both the batters and pitchers data. The independent variables are a
combination of the same metrics in the non-MLB leagues, dummies, and dummy
interactions. I dropped the age variable from my models because its inclusion lowered the
adjusted R-squared values in each of my regressions with the batters data. The table
shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between non-MLB
performance and MLB performance in most cases. The coefficient on non-MLB strikeout
rate for batters in the first regression is statistically significant and equal to 1.4, so a one17

percentage point increase in a player’s non-MLB strikeout rate correlates to a 1.4
percentage point increase in the MLB, holding all other variables constant. The
regression also includes the interactions of non-MLB strikeout rate with the NCAA and
NPB dummies. Therefore, the interpretation of the 1.4 coefficient is the effect of nonMLB performance on MLB performance for KBO players. The coefficient on the
interaction between strikeout rate and the NCAA dummy is statistically insignificant,
indicating that NCAA strikeout rate has the same predictive power as KBO strikeout rate.
The coefficient on the interaction between strikeout rate and the NPB dummy is -1.4,
offsetting the coefficient on non-MLB strikeout rate, suggesting that NPB strikeout rate
does not predict MLB strikeout rate. The non-MLB walk rate coefficient for batters is not
statistically significant, nor are the interaction terms significant, indicating that there is no
relationship between the walk rates in the foreign/amateur leagues and MLB walk rates.
For non-MLB home run rate, the coefficient is statistically significant and equal to 0.6,
meaning a one-percentage point increase in KBO home run rate corresponds to a 0.6
percentage point increase in MLB home run rate. The variable representing interaction
between the NCAA and non-MLB home run rate is also statistically significant and equal
to -0.5, so a one-percentage point increase in NCAA home run rate correlates with a 0.1
percentage point increase in MLB home run rate. Likewise, the NPB and non-MLB home
run rate interaction variable is statistically significant and equal to -0.5, meaning a one
percentage point increase in NPB home run rate correlates to a 0.1 percentage point
increase in MLB home run rate.
In the pitchers data, the coefficient on non-MLB strikeout rate is statistically
significant and equal to 0.6. Holding all other variables constant, a one-percentage point
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increase in player’s KBO strikeout rate is correlates with a 0.6 percentage point increase
in his MLB strikeout rate. The interactions between the NPB/NCAA dummies and nonMLB strikeout rate for pitchers are not statistically significant, so we can conclude a onepercentage point increase in strikeout rate in these leagues also corresponds to a 0.6
percentage point increase in MLB strikeout rate. The constant in this regression is
statistically significant and equal to 5.5, so a pitcher’s strikeout rate is expected to
increase 5.5 percentage points if non-MLB strikeout rate is zero. The coefficient on nonMLB walk rate is 0.7 and statistically significant, so a one-percentage point in KBO walk
rate correlates with a 0.7 increase in MLB walk rate. Again, the interactions between the
NPB/NCAA dummies and non-MLB walk rate are not statistically significant, so I
assume a one-percentage point increase in walk rate in these leagues also corresponds
with a 0.7 increase in MLB walk rate. The constant is statistically significant and equal to
3.1, so a pitcher’s walk rate is expected to increase by 3.1 percentage points should the
non-MLB walk rate be zero. The coefficient on non-MLB home run rate is not
statistically significant, so it does not appear that non-MLB home run rate is predictive of
MLB home run rate for pitchers. The constant on this model is statistically significant,
equaling 2.7, so a pitcher’s home run rate should increase by 2.7 percentage points if nonMLB home run rate is zero.
The adjusted R-squared value on my first estimation is 0.286, meaning my
regression explains only 28.6% of the variation in MLB strikeout rate. Figure 1 shows the
relationship between non-MLB strikeout rate and MLB strikeout rate among batters
visually, and it does not appear to be strong.
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Figure 1

Figure 1 illustrates a stronger relationship in non-MLB strikeout rate and MLB strikeout
rate for the KBO and NCAA, which fits in line with the observations from Table 3. In the
walk rate estimation for batters, the adjusted R-squared is 0.096, meaning this estimation
explains only 9.6% of the variation in MLB walk rate. Looking at a graph of the walk
rate data, it does not appear that the walk rate relationship is particularly weaker in any of
the leagues, rather noisy throughout the entire data.
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Figure 2

The adjusted R-squared for the home run rate model in the batters data is 0.378, meaning
this regression accounts for 37.8% of the variation in MLB home run rate. Analyzing the
graph details further insight I can garner from this data.

Figure 3

The data is relatively compact along the x-axis aside from three outliers that fall
significantly to the right of the rest of the data. Darnell Coles, Kevin Witt, and Jolbert
Cabrera each have high NPB home run rates (all above 10%) and low MLB home run
rates (all below 4%). Perhaps these outliers are due to small sample size. Each of the
three outlier players from the NPB accumulated more than 500 plate appearances in the
NPB over the three-year window being studied, but Coles and Witt fell short of 400 plate
appearances in the MLB over the following three-year window, and Cabrera only
amassed 517 MLB plate appearances. Each of these three players reached the 170 plate
appearances stabilization point for a hitter’s home run rate outlined in Carleton (2007).
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Despite these outliers, I am still able to develop a model with non-MLB home run rate as
a statistically significant predictor of MLB home run rate.
Looking again at the pitchers data, the adjusted R-squared value for the model
analyzing strikeout rate is 0.342, this model can account for meaning 34.2% of the
variation in MLB strikeout rate. The graph of non-MLB strikeout rate and strikeout rate
for pitchers indicates a fairly linear relationship between the metrics.

Figure 4

The non-MLB and MLB relationship for this metric appears particularly strong
based on the graph. This played out in the model results with a lower p-value for nonMLB strikeout rate for pitchers than seen in the other models. Unlike when regressing
non-MLB strikeout rate on MLB strikeout rate for batters, there is not one league that
stands out as having a weaker relationship than the others as observed with the NPB in
the batters data. The adjusted R-squared on the walk rate model for pitchers is relatively
low at just 0.222 meaning this regression accounts for only 22.2% of the variation in
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MLB walk. Figure 5, the graph of non-MLB walk rate and MLB walk rate from the
pitchers data, is not as tight around the center as the graph in Figure 4. This graph gets
less compact as the non-MLB walk rate increases. One potential conclusion to draw from
this is that non-MLB walk rate is only particularly useful as a predictor when it is below a
certain threshold.

Figure 5

The adjusted R-squared value for the home run rate model is -0.004, and my model does
not account for any of the variation in MLB home run rate. This makes sense since the
variable non-MLB home run rate was not statistically significant.
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Figure 6

Figure 6 shows the plot of non-MLB and MLB home run rates for pitchers and details a
sharp upward-sloping relationship between these metrics aside from one major outlier,
which lies significantly rightward of the group. Walker’s metrics are drawn from a
sample of 1,337 MLB batters faced but only 214 non-MLB batters faced. Walker’s
inclusion makes the best fit horizontal rather than vertical. This is an example of the issue
with using the 170 rule on a pitcher’s home run rate, as it appears Walker’s home run rate
in the NPB failed to stabilize, sitting extremely high at 8.41%, whereas his MLB home
run rate settled at a much more reasonable 3.29%.
7. Using Playing Time as a Performance Metric
I also decided to do some estimations on MLB plate appearances and MLB
batters faced. These measures of engagements can represent a performance metric. In
theory, the best players are going to get more chances to play, and will accumulate more
plate appearances/batters faced over time as a result. There are, however, a number of
factors go into playing time, not just performance and ability. A player might find himself
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with more opportunities on an MLB team with inferior players at the position he plays
simply because of the situation he is placed in. The data I am working with does not
cover all of these factors, but the analysis is still worthwhile. I am able to ignore the 170
rule in this analysis, and as a result, my batters data increases to 140 players, while my
pitchers data increases to 149 players. For this analysis, it is important to keep in mind
that I am no longer looking at rates, rather the raw volume of plate appearances/batters
faced. It should be noted that the season lengths for these leagues are all different; MLB
plays a 162-game regular season, whereas the NPB is a 143-game regular season, the
KBO is a 144-game regular season, and the NCAA is about a 60-game regular season,
varying from team to team. Table 4 shows the results of three regressions run on the
batters data.
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Table 4

The first model is a regression on MLB plate appearances with plate appearances
in the foreign or amateur league as the only independent variable. There is a statistically
significant and positive relationship between plate appearances in the non-MLB leagues

26

and MLB. The coefficient on the independent variable is 0.4, meaning an increase in nonMLB plate appearances by one correlates with a 0.4 unit increase in MLB plate
appearances. The constant is also statistically significant and equal to 141.1, so MLB
plate appearances are expected to increase by 141.1 if non-MLB plate appearances is
zero. The adjusted R-squared on this model is 0.148, meaning non-MLB playing time
explains about 14.8% of the variance in MLB playing time. My second estimation does
not include the interaction variables, and the foreign/amateur plate appearance variable is
statistically significant with a positive relationship again. The coefficient is equal to 0.4,
so increasing non-MLB plate appearances by one corresponds to a 0.4 increase in MLB
PAs. The adjusted R-squared of this model is 0.144, so this estimation accounts for
14.4% of the variance in MLB plate appearances. This is not as high as the original
model with just foreign/amateur plate appearances as the lone independent variable. My
final estimation includes the foreign/amateur plate appearances as well as the
foreign/amateur performance metrics, dummy variables, age variable, and the interactions
between the performance metrics and dummies. I lose the statistical significance of
foreign/amateur plate appearances and the adjusted R-squared dips to 0.136, so the model
only accounts for 13.6% of the variance in my MLB plate appearances. Adding in these
extra independent variables did not increase the model’s usefulness, and the interactions
did not help differentiate the translations between leagues. It does not appear that these
performance metrics in foreign and amateur leagues are good predictors of playing time
in the MLB for batters.
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Table 5

In my first estimation from Table 5, regressing MLB batters faced on non-MLB
batters faced, I see similar results to those from my batters data. There is a statistically
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significant and positive relationship between foreign/amateur batters faced and MLB
batters faced. The coefficient is equal to 0.5, so increasing foreign/amateur batters faced
by one unit corresponds to a 0.5 unit increase in MLB batters faced. The constant is
statistically significant and equal to 251.4, so a pitcher’s batters faced is expected to
increase by an average of 251.4 MLB should the non-MLB batters faced total equal zero.
It is interesting that the adjusted R-squared for this model is significantly higher than the
first model estimating MLB plate appearances with the batters data. In this case, it is
0.236, meaning non-MLB playing time accounts for about 23.6% of the variation in MLB
playing time among pitchers. The second model gives me statistically significant nonMLB batters faced, age, dummyNCAA variables and constant. The coefficient on nonMLB batters faced is 0.4, so increasing non-MLB batters faced by one correlates with a
0.4 increase in MLB BFs. The constant coefficient jumps to 1,783.8, so a pitcher with
zero non-MLB batters faced would an average of 1,783.8 MLB batters faced according to
this estimation. The adjusted R-squared is up to 0.32, so this estimation accounts for 32%
of the variation in MLB batters faced. I am observing a pattern where age appears to
affect performance in pitchers more than in batters. In the final estimation,
foreign/amateur batters faced is not statistically significant, but the age variable is, and
the adjusted R-squared falls to 0.2852, meaning the model accounts for 28.52% of
variation in MLB batters faced.
8.1 How effective is predicting future MLB performance with past MLB
performance?
My models turned out to be relatively non-predictive of MLB performance for
players making the transition from the NCAA, NPB and KBO. Limiting performance to a
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six-year window, the strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate for batters and pitchers
in the final three years in a foreign/amateur league do not strongly correlate to the same
metrics for the first three years of a player’s MLB career. This brings up the question of
what actually does predict MLB performance. More specifically, is past performance a
good predictor of future performance? I decided to do a similar regression analysis for
future MLB performance on past MLB performance. I used the Sean Lahman data and
calculated the strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate metrics using strikeouts, walks,
home runs, and plate appearances. I applied the 170 rule based on the work done by
Carleton (2007), and constrained my evaluation to a similar six-year window where I
used the first three years of a player’s MLB career to predict the next three years in terms
of strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate.

Table 6

This is the result for batters. There are 3,151 observations for the walk rate and
home run rate models, and 2,710 for the strikeout rate models. There were about 390 NAs
for my pre_KRate variable, and 318 for the post_KRate variable, some of which
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overlapped, explaining the difference in observations. This was due to some missing
values in the Lahman data. I used the metrics for seasons 4-6 of a player’s career as the
dependent variables, and the metrics for seasons 1-3 of a player’s career as the only
independent variables, replicating the three-year window used in my foreign and amateur
league models.
Each of my independent variables in the three estimations are statistically
significant with p-values less than 0.01. The first model’s coefficient is equal to 0.9, so a
one percentage point increase in strikeout rate in a three-year period of a player’s career
corresponds to a 0.9 percentage point strikeout rate increase in an ensuing three-year
period. The constant is statistically significant and equal to 0.6, suggesting that strikeout
rate increases by 0.6 percentage points in an ensuing three-year period regardless of
performance in the prior three-year period. The coefficient on the walk rate model is
equal to 0.9, meaning a one percentage point increase in a player’s walk rate in a threeyear window correlates with a 0.9 percentage point increase walk rate for the ensuing
three-year period. The constant in this model is statistically significant and equal to 1.7,
indicating walk rate in an ensuing three-year period increases by 1.7 percentage points no
matter performance in the prior three-year window. The coefficient on the home run rate
model is also 0.9; a one percentage point increase in a player’s home run rate in a threeyear window corresponds with a 0.9 percentage point increase home run rate for the
ensuing three-year period. The constant here is statistically significant and equal to 0.3,
meaning home run rate should increase by 0.3 percentage points in an ensuing three-year
window regardless of performance in the prior three-year window. Each of these
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coefficients indicate nearly one-to-one relationships between these metrics from one
three-year period to the next.
The adjusted R-squared value for regression of future strikeout rate on past
strikeout rate is 0.811, meaning past strikeout rate can account for 81.1% of the variation
in future strikeout rate. The adjusted R-squared value for doing the same with walk rate
was also relatively high at 0.619, indicating past walk rate for batters accounts for 61.9%
of the variation in future walk rate. For home run rate, the adjusted R-squared was 0.698;
I can account for 69.8% of the variation in future home run rate with past home run rate.
These R-squared values, even in the home run rate model, are much higher than
the ones I got when estimating with foreign and amateur stats. The adjusted R-squared on
the foreign/amateur strikeout rate model for batters was 0.286, much lower than the 0.811
figure for the MLB on MLB model. On the walk rate model for batters, the adjusted Rsquared was 0.096, again significantly lower than the 0.619 figure obtained in this
section’s walk rate model. The adjusted R-squared on the home run rate model for batters
was 0.378, lower than the 0.698 number for this home run rate model. I can conclude that
past MLB performance for batters is much more predictive of future MLB performance
than past performance in foreign and amateur leagues.
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Table 7

Table 7 shows the results of similar estimations with my MLB pitchers data. This
time, I have 2,545 observations for each regression. The coefficient on past strikeout rate
is statistically significant and equal to 0.9, meaning a one percentage point increase in
strikeout rate for a three-year period correlates to a 0.9 percentage point increase in
strikeout rate in the ensuing three-year period. This is the only pitcher metric with a near
one-to-one relationship between past performance and future performance. The constant
is equal to 1.1, so future strikeout rate is expected to increase by 1.1 percentage points
regardless of past strikeout rate. The coefficient on walk rate is statistically significant
and equal to 0.6, so a one percentage point increase in past walk rate corresponds to a 0.6
percentage point increase in future walk rate. The constant is equal to 2.9; future walk
rate is expected to increase by 2.9 percentage points disregarding past performance. The
coefficient on past home run rate is statistically significant and equal to 0.7, indicating a

33

one percentage point increase in home run rate for one three-year period correlates to a
0.7 percentage point increase in home run rate for the ensuing three-year period. The
constant equals 0.6, suggesting future home run rate will increase by 0.6 percentage
points regardless of past performance.
The adjusted R-squared values are a bit lower this time; for regressing future
strikeout rate on past strikeout rate, the adjusted R-squared is 0.694, meaning past
strikeout rate accounts for 69.4% of the variation in future strikeout rate. The adjusted Rsquared on the walk rate estimation is low at 0.387, so this estimation only accounts for
38.7% of the variation in future walk. On home run rate, the adjusted R-squared was
0.467; past home run rate accounts for 46.7% of the variation in future home run.
These adjusted R-squared figures are higher than the figures on the
foreign/amateur models. The adjusted R-squared for the foreign/amateur strikeout rate
pitchers model is 0.342, compared to 0.694 here. On the pitcher walk rate models, the
foreign/amateur adjusted R-squared is 0.222, whereas on the MLB model it is 0.387. For
the pitcher home run rate models, the foreign/amateur adjusted R-squared is zero, and
here it is 0.467. I can conclude that pitcher performance, just like batter performance, is
easier to predict with past MLB performance than with past performance in the KBO,
NPB, or NCAA.
It appears that predicting future performance with past performance is more
effective for batters than for pitchers, with a significant adjusted R-squared gap coming in
walk rate, and another considerable adjusted R-squared gap in home run rate. Based on
this analysis, I can pretty confidently predict future strikeout rate based on past strikeout
rate, but at best predict only about 80% of the variation in future performance based on
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past performance, and more realistically closer to 60%-70%. This helps put the low
adjusted R-squared values in my estimations from Chapter 6 into context; past
performance is not a perfect way to predict future performance.
8.2 Do existing prediction models outperform predictions based on past
performance?
In this section, I compare an existing prediction model to my models in section
8.1, which is solely based on past performance. Prediction models like ZiPS, Steamer,
and Depth Charts are published every year for predicting future MLB performance, but
even these well-developed models are not perfect. Forecasting future performance is an
inexact science; if it were exact, there would be no arbitrage, and teams would value
every player the same as everyone else does.
Dan Szymborski, the creator of the ZiPS projection system, was kind enough to
give me data with the ZiPS projections dating back to the 2015 season. I combined this
with the Lahman MLB data, which is updated through 2016, to perform an analysis of
how well Szymborski was able to predict performance in the 2015 and 2016 MLB
seasons with his ZiPS projections. For the analysis, I used the following estimator for
batters faced, which was not included in Szymborski’s projections, and was needed to
calculate the strikeout rate/walk rate/home run rate for pitchers. This specific estimator
was suggested by Szymborski himself, and is endorsed by Voros McCracken, the creator
of Defense Independent Pitching Statistics (DIPS) and a pioneer of baseball sabermetrics.
Batters faced=(((Innings Pitched*3)-Strikeouts)*.966)+Hits+Walks+Strikeouts
For some background on Szymborski’s methodology, he uses weighted averages
of four years of past performance (8/5/4/3), or three years for players at the extreme ends
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of aging curves (very young or very old), and regresses past performance on DIPS theory
and BABIP theory, while also incorporating age effects based on historical players with
similar statistical profiles.

Table 8

Table 8 shows the results of regressing strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate
for batters on the ZiPS projections from the 2015 and 2016 seasons. The three
independent variables are each statistically significant with very low p-values. The
coefficients are all close to one. For predicted strikeout rate, the coefficient is 0.9,
indicating a one-percentage point increase in predicted strikeout rate corresponds to a 0.9
percentage point increase in actual strikeout rate. The coefficient on predicted walk rate is
also 0.9, so a one percentage point increase in predicted walk rate correlates to a 0.9

36

percentage point increase in actual walk rate. The coefficient on home run rate is 0.9,
meaning a one percentage point increase in predicted home run rate indicates a 0.9
percentage point increase in actual home run rate. The constants are all statistically
significant and positive, suggesting Szymborski underestimates each of these three
metrics.
The adjusted R-squared values are all lower than 0.7. The adjusted R-squared is
highest on the strikeout rate model at 0.674, which continues the trend of strikeout rate
being a bit easier to predict than walk rate and home run rate, and means Szymborski’s
strikeout rate predictions account for 67.4% of the variance in real strikeout rate. On the
walk rate model, the adjusted R-squared is 0.531, so only ZiPS’ predicted walk rate
accounts for 53.1% of the variance in real walk. The adjusted R-squared on the home run
rate model is similar, 0.518, meaning ZiPS’ predicted home run rate accounts for 51.8%
of the variance in real home run.
I calculated the root mean square error on Szymborski’s predictions, then used
the MLB on MLB models from section 8.1 to make predictions on the same players from
the 2015-2016 seasons, and calculated the root mean square error for these predictions.
Because my MLB on MLB models predict statistics for a three-year window, I used the
2012-2014 seasons to predict metrics for the 2015-2017 seasons, and used the latter
three-year window as my 2015 and 2016 predictions. The root mean square error on
predicted strikeout rate versus actual strikeout rate for Szymborski’s batters predictions is
0.174, which is only slightly lower than the root mean square error on predictions with
my model, 0.186.
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Figure 7

Figure 7 shows my a plot of my predictions and the actual strikeout rates on the left, and
ZiPS predictions with the actual strikeout rates on the right. The red line represents what
a perfectly linear relationship would look like. Szymborski’s predictions appear to center
around the red line a bit tighter than mine do, as I see a few more outliers towards the
upper-right side of the plot containing my predictions. On predicting walk rate for batters,
ZiPS yielded a 0.312 root mean square error, lower than the 0.388 figure my predictions
yielded.

Figure 8
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In figure 8, again my predictions are on the left, with the ZiPS predictions on the right.
Both Szymborski and I struggled a bit more to fit our predictions around the red line this
time. The root mean square error on home run rate predictions for batters was 0.281 for
ZiPS and 0.107 for the MLB on MLB model. My home run rate predictions significantly
outperformed Szymborski’s.

Figure 9

Figure 9 shows my home run rate predictions on the left, and Szymborski’s on the right.
It appears that both of us have points significantly to the left and above of the red line.
ZiPS has a few outliers in the 7-8% range that likely spiked the root mean square error;
my max-predicted home run rate was 6.04% (Chris Davis).
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Table 9

Table 9 shows the results of the same regressions with pitchers data from
Szymborski and Lahman. It appears that pitcher performance is more difficult to predict
for Szymborski. The coefficients on the independent variables are all statistically
significant. In the strikeout rate model, the coefficient is equal to 0.9, so a one-percentage
point increase in predicted strikeout rate correlates with a 0.9 percentage point increase in
actual strikeout rate. The coefficient on predicted walk rate is equal to 0.7, so a onepercentage point increase in predicted walk rate only corresponds to a 0.7 percentage
point increase in actual walk rate. On predicted home run rate, the coefficient is equal to
0.6, meaning a one percentage point increase in predicted home run rate correlates to a
0.6 percentage point increase in actual home run rate. The constants are also all
statistically significant. They are greater than one in the strikeout rate and walk rate
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models, indicating Szymborski underestimated these metrics in his predictions, while the
home run rate model constant is less than one, suggesting Szymborski overestimated
home run rate in his predictions.
The adjusted R-squared value on the strikeout rate model is 0.511, so
Szymborski’s predicted strikeout rate accounts for 51.1% of the variation in real
strikeout. On the walk rate model, the adjusted R-squared is 0.304, meaning ZiPS’ walk
rate predictions account for 30.4% of the variance in actual walk rate. On the home run
rate model, the adjusted R-squared was 0.111, so only ZiPS’ home run rate predictions
only account for 11.1% of the variance in actual home run rate.
Again, I used my models from section 8.1 to make my own predictions for
strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate for pitchers in the 2015 and 2016 seasons for
a comparison against the ZiPS predictions. The root mean square error for on
Szymborski’s predicted strikeout rate vs. actual strikeout rate is 0.197, whereas my
predictions yield a root mean square error of 0.205, so Szymborski once again narrowly
edges me in predicting strikeout rate.

Figure 10
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Figure 10 shows my strikeout rate predictions versus the actual strikeout rates on the left,
and ZiPS’ predictions versus the actual strikeout rates on the right, with the red line
representing a perfectly linear relationship. ZiPS predictions appear to fit tighter around
the red line than mine. Szymborski’s root mean square error for predicted walk rate on
actual walk rate is 0.382, and mine is 0.438. Again, ZiPS outperforms my model in
predicting walk rate.

Figure 11

Figure 11 shows my predictions for walk rate on the left, and Szymborski’s on the right.
We both struggled to predict pitcher walk rate with relatively high root mean square error
values, and the plots support this. The root mean square error on ZiPS’ predicted home
run rate versus actual home run rate is 0.16, and on my model it is 0.309; this time
Szymborski predicts home run rate much more effectively than me.
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Figure 12

Again, my predictions are on the left in Figure 12, while the ZiPS predictions are on the
right. It appears that my model underestimated too many home run rates; my highest
prediction was 4.16% (Paul Clemens), and second highest was only 3.67% (Jason Motte).
9. Conclusion
Variation in player performance is apart part of what makes sports interesting. A
player like J.D. Martinez can be released by one of the smartest organizations in sports,
the Houston Astros, only to end up on a different team for a minimum salary and become
one of the best hitters in baseball. Even the best front office executives in the world can
be stumped when it comes to evaluating players in an open market like free agency. Theo
Epstein is the current General Manager of the Chicago Cubs, and an executive who will
one day enter the Baseball Hall of Fame. Even he is not perfect, infamously valuing Carl
Crawford so highly after the 2010 season that he signed him to a 7-year/$142 million
contract, only to see him traded in a salary-dump trade less than two years into his
contract, and only after Epstein was fired by the Boston Red Sox.
My analysis on player predictions based on my MLB on MLB models and Dan
Szymborski’s ZiPS projection system reveals that predicting performance in general is
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extremely difficult. Although the adjusted R-squared values on these models were much
greater than on my foreign/amateur league models, they were still not particularly close
to one. ZiPS’ predictions beat my own predictions based on my models using solely past
player performance for each metric except batter home run rate, although my root mean
square errors were close to those that ZiPS’ predictions yielded for the most part. ZiPS is
a commonly used and cited projection system, published annually on Fangraphs.com, one
of the premier sources for statistical analysis in baseball. Yet even a projection system as
highly thought of as ZiPS is far from perfect.
When it comes to evaluating how a player’s performance will translate from the
NCAA, KBO, or NPB to the MLB, there appear to be too many factors at hand. For
players coming from the NPB and KBO, many of these are native to Japan and South
Korea, and may be experiencing western culture for the first time, thrust into not only
what could be an uncomfortable environment, but also tasked with facing the toughest
baseball competition in the world for the first time. Professional teams in all sports have
acknowledged the effect an athlete’s mental state can have on player performance with
the recent trend of teams hiring sports psychologists. As for players coming from college,
the MLB has a steep learning curve, and using the three-year window restriction is more
complicated when looking at college players because I limit the seasons before a player
enters his prime in his late 20s most of the time since the transition happens at a young
age. It can take years for a player to break out and reach his full potential.
What my project reveals is that there is a lot of noise inherent in player
performance in baseball. For every foreigner who struggles to perform at a high level in
their first few seasons playing in the United States, there are others who thrive in the
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same situations. A player might be hitting his physical and athletic peak in his first year
playing Major League Baseball, and would have seen a jump in performance had he
stayed in playing in the NCAA or overseas. Injuries are also unpredictable, and
attempting to play through them can distort player evaluations when using statistics. This
makes predicting the performance of players adjusting to completely new environments
both on the field and off of it a tricky task.
My project reveals a couple of noteworthy trends that could be worth further
study. The first is that age seemed to affect pitcher performance more than batter
performance, which fits in lines with the findings of Fair (2008). Another pattern I
observed was that strikeout rates are much easier to predict to than walk rates and home
run rates. Lastly, batter performance, based on these metrics, appears to be generally
easier to predict than pitcher performance.
Perhaps as statistical analysis in baseball continues to evolve, newly developed
metrics could paint a clearer picture on how performance will translate. It could be that
breaking down a batter’s swing plane or a pitcher’s arm action, a more mechanical of
evaluation a player, is a better way to predict performance in a different competitive
environment. Taking a “process is greater than results” approach, it could be that hard-hit
rates for both batters and pitchers are a better true indicator of quality. Either way,
statistical analysis, in its current form and through the metrics studied in this paper, is not
particularly predictive of MLB performance when coming from a different league.
Despite this, there is still evidence that teams are taking performance in other
leagues into consideration when evaluating potential signees. Just this past winter, the St.
Louis Cardinals signed Miles Mikolas, a pitcher who threw 91.1 innings across the 2012-
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14 seasons in the MLB and compiled a mediocre 5.32 ERA before thriving in the NPB in
the 2015-17 seasons. Mikolas parlayed a stellar 2.18 ERA and 5.48 strikeout-to-walk
ratio in 424.2 innings into a 2-year/$15.5 million contract and another shot in the MLB.
Unless the Cardinals uncovered some sort of mechanical change that Milokas made in
recent years, it is hard to argue that their front office did not look at his statistics and
liked what they saw. So yes, statistical analysis does still matter when evaluating players
in other leagues, and major league teams continue to acknowledge that. It is a matter of
understanding that even strong player performance like that of Mikolas often contains
more noise than signal.

46

APPENDIX
All coding for this project was done in R. These are descriptions of the various R files:
Extra Data.R
This file contains the wrangling for the supplementary data I used. Since the original
sources for KBO and NPB data only went through the 2008 season, and a significant
portion of the players to transition from these leagues to the MLB made the transition
after 2008, I added data on post-2008 players from baseballreference.com. I read the
various baseballreference.com files, assign name and league dummy variables, and
combine them into four separate files: “extra nbp batting.csv”, “extra npb pitching.csv”,
extra “kbo batting.csv”, and “extra kbo pitching.csv”. These files are exported and used
in “Thesis Data.R”.
Thesis Data.R
This file contains all of the data manipulation from the raw MLB, NCAA, NPB, and
KBO files as well as the files from Extra Data.R. I read in the files, select the variables
needed for my project, rename the variables so that they are consistent across the
different data sheets, join master sheets with the sheets containing statistics, assign
various league dummy variables, calculate an estimated age variable for the MLB, NPB,
and KBO files, combine the sheets into one for batters and one for pitchers, including the
supplementary data exported from “Extra Data.R”, create player variables containing first
and last names, construct my three-year observation windows, tag the final non-MLB
seasons and corresponding ages, filter out some duplicates, collapse the data so that each
observation contains a player’s non-MLB and MLB statistics across the three-year
windows being studied, and export these final data sheets for use in “Thesis
Regressions.R”. This file also contains the wrangling for my MLB on MLB analysis
(section 3), which involved creation of a player variable, applying Carleton’s 170 rule,
creation of a cumulative years variable and corresponding filtering, splitting the data into
pre (seasons 1-3) and post (seasons 4-6) sheets, and the exporting of these sheets for use
in “MLB on MLB Analysis.R”
Thesis Regressions.R
This file contains the code for the foreign/amateur regressions in Chapter 6. I read in the
exported files from “Thesis Data.R”, calculate the strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run
rate metrics, apply Carleton’s 170 rule, write code for descriptive stats, plots, strikeout
rate/walk rate/home run rate regressions for both batters and pitchers, tables, and plate
appearances/batters faced models discussed in Chapter 7.
MLB on MLB Analysis.R
This file contains the code for my MLB on MLB analysis done in Chapter 8. It begins
with reading in the files, applying Carleton’s 170 rule, calculating strikeout rate, walk
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rate, and home run rate, then modeling and coding tables. I eventually use these models
to make predictions for use of comparing against my models’ predictive power with the
ZiPS’ projections. I load in the “ZiPS Batting Predictions 2015 and 2016.csv” and “ZiPS
Pitching Predictions 2015 and 2016.csv” files exported from “ZiPS Analysis.R”, load in
the Sean Lahman data, rename some of Lahman’s variables, join the Lahman statistics
with the Lahman master sheet, collapse the data so that each observation contains a
player’s statistics for the 2012-2014 seasons, calculate the strikeout rates/walk rates/home
run rates to be used as inputs for my MLB on MLB model predictions, join this data with
the ZiPS data, and make predictions for 2015 and 2016 strikeout rate, walk rate, and
home run rate for batters and pitchers, then calculate the root mean square error for both
my predictions and the ZiPS projections, and compare graphs.
ZiPS Analysis.R
This file contains the code for analysis of Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projection system. I
read in the ZiPS files for the 2015 and 2016 seasons, combine the seasons into one sheet
for batters and one sheet for pitchers, calculate his predictions for strikeout rate, walk
rate, and home run rate, re-split the data into separate seasons, load in the Lahman data,
rename Lahman’s variables, join the Lahman sheets with Lahman’s master sheet,
calculate strikeout rate/walk rate/home run rate with the Lahman data, split the Lahman
data into 2015 and 2016 sheets, combine these with ZiPS 2015 and 2016 sheets, then recombine the 2015 and 2016 sheets for batters and pitchers, model with these sheets,
calculate root mean square error to evaluate the accuracy of ZiPS, and export these final
sheets containing ZiPS predictions for use in “MLB on MLB Analysis.R”.
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